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Abstract 
Psychic movements are headed as expressions towards soma, behavior (act) and psychism (representation, dream, 
and thinking). A comparative discussion regarding the somatisation process in relation with act and representation 
reveals the difference between body and soma. While the body is located in the psychic territory of the reversible 
subjective time, the soma is located at the border of the psychic space, towards the external reality of the irreversible 
objective time. The pathology of evacuation of the psychic tension supposes a certain confusion or non-
differentiation between body image and soma, as well as between internal and external reality.
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1. Internal and external expressions of psychic tension 
S. Freud speaks about the „limit” in 1915, when he defines the concept of drive: “[…] the drive 
appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical 
representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of 
the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body” (Freud, 1915, 
p. 64).
Besides the meaning „limit of concept” (Green, 1997, p. 48), we are also dealing with the idea of 
frontier between psychic and somatic looking from inside the psychic apparatus towards its exterior (the 
drive is already a psychic representative).  
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In The Interpretation of Dreams, the psychic apparatus seems to have two “windows”: perception and 
motricity; the excitation – thus the drive – “move” around or towards one another (Freud, 1900).  
Given the points of view that arise from the first Freudian topic, combined with the idea of „drive 
movement” particular to the second topic, I would like to put forward the theme in the title taking into 
account two aspects as terms of reference. 
The first is the dream,  a regressive process unto the perceptive pole, with the hallucination of 
perception: the representation becomes sensoriality and, says Freud, “the conceptual content is not 
thought, but is transformed into visual images, to which we give credence, and which we believe that we 
experience” (Freud, 1900, pp. 490-498, my emphasis). 
For him the dream represented the „royal” way towards the Unconscious. And the kleinian theory used 
it a lot, in order to illustrate the mechanism of projective identification, a mechanism that was later 
considered an utmost under an interpersonal light and which led to a dual functioning model in cure.  The 
dream has an extremely useful ambiguity for the study of the Unconscious: it is lived by the subject as an 
external reality, on the other hand, at awakening and when recalled no doubt rests on his subjective nature 
of internal reality (on the author and the dream’s inner source), although felt as “foreign”. 
The other extremity taken into account for the psychic apparatus, the extremity of motricity, is the 
frontier towards act. The act was described as an essential element for the matter of borderline states, 
unlike neuroses that „deal” better with representations.   
Serving as illustrations, two „cases” come to my mind. One is The Kreutzer Sonata by Tolstoi (1889), 
where Pozdnîúev’s murder act, although a real, external act, is perceived in an unconscious way as though 
being dreamt, internal, reversible; only by looking at his dead wife, in the coffin, three days after the 
murder does he have the revelation of the irreversible objective time, that vectorilly passes by, from life to 
death. 
“Then only, when I saw her dead face, did I understand all that I had done. I understood that it was I, I, 
who  had  killed  her  […]  I  was  the  cause  […],  and  there  was  no  way,  never,  nowhere,  of  repairing  this  
thing” (Tolstoi, p. 103, my emphasize). The character also seems to experience the revelation of his 
clearly distinguished Ego. Moreover, he tries to equate "never" with "nowhere" and "no way" in a similar 
failed attempt to avoid the traumatic revelation of his limits and of the external reality limits. 
The second „case” is one related to the reference point „act” namely the case patented as illustrating 
borderline pathology, of M. Little. In accounting her analysis with Winnicott, she relates a fragment that 
took place in one of the first sessions. Overwhelmed by the fact that she will never be able to 
communicate with the analyst, she started to gander the cabinet and then thought: “I contemplated 
throwing myself out of the window, but felt that he would stop me [?].Then I thought of throwing out all 
his books, but finally I attacked and smashed a large vase filled with white lilac, and trampled on it. In a 
flash he was gone from the room […]Next day an exact replica had replaced the vase and the lilac […] 
Neither of us ever referred to it again, which seems odd to me now” (Little, 1985, p. 122). 
I noticed that, out of all the scene, the only version that became act was the one not thought 
consciously. The dream-act analogy would be that, as „images seem to think themselves” in the dream, as  
bionian and lacanian writings said, in such borderline states „the act seems to think” itself, without a 
subject to think.  
2. Somatic expressions of psychic tension  
From a clinical point of view, patients associated with psychosomatics mainly present a somatic 
symptom – functional or tissual – and a psychic symptom.  
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Although he was never particularly preoccupied with this matter, Freud thought of the psyche and 
body as representing a unit. However he clearly established the boundaries of his field of exploitation, as 
being strictly the psychological field, while the organic field couldn’t or wouldn’t be exploited.   
From the ferenczian point of view, the illness could be a defence measure against unconscious psychic 
processes. It even assumed that a psychotic pathology, for instance melancholy, could be cured following 
an organic illness. The kleinian view imagined the source of the organic illness as staging and 
dramatizing some archaic phantasms. Moreover, the illness would also be a defensive method against 
psychosis.  
A concept that turned in a true paradigm, especially in France, appeared during the 60’s. The main idea 
was that of somatic disorders due to a deficiency in mentalization, related to a psychic dysfunction of an 
economic type. The representatives of the Paris Psychosomatic School are P. Marty, M. De M’Uzan, C. 
David, M. Fain (1963).  The fundamental notion is that of „deficiency” or „psychic deficit”, some sort of 
negative of the neurotic functioning, distorting negative, that has no neurotic mental defences capable of 
adjusting the psychic energetics. We are not dealing with a meaning of malady, but with a disinvestment 
or counter-investment of an economic nature.  
„Operative thinking” is described as specific to this so called „linear” functioning, because it lacks 
affect, it focuses on factual, on describing, on concrete instances and is poor in associations that send to a 
phantasmatic or oniric. The relationship with the other is described as „white”, without affective 
involvement, and the intellectualization degree of the communication has a stereotype nature, with a weak 
symbolist capacity. The effort on a pre-conscious level seems quasi absent. The subject seems to maintain 
a distance from all forms of psychic conflicts.  
The concept of essential depression or „depression without an object” is associated to the operative 
thinking, which is however difficult to diagnose, as it lacks the depressive affect. This thing proves that 
the psychic economy involved not only reaches thinking, but also the affective sphere. Such a 
“disaffection”, that McDougall called “pulverisation of affects”, was seen as a true “survival technique” 
of the subject confronted with an intolerable perspective of sufferance (McDougall, 1989). Reaching the 
affective sphere determined Marty to modify the “operative thinking” term in “operative life’.   
Marty describes a true ierarhization of psychic functions, starting from the most sophisticated mental 
functions and reaching the somatic functions. The operative pathology conditions determine a dis-
ierarhization: from a mental level, the operative defence mechanisms and the essential depression lead to 
somatisation through psychic disarray (Marty, 1980). 
More recently, M. Aisenstein shows that the emergence of a somatic illness is the result of numerous 
factors, among which we may find the psychic factor. She mentions the following fact as proof of the 
economic (energetic) aspect’s intervention in psychosomatics: severe mental disorders, like melancholy, 
temporarily disappear in the course of a intercurrent organic illness (2010, p. 1367). Starting from the 
Freudian definition of drive as « demands of the psychic effort » the same author formulates a further 
step: drive as demand for representation.  
Therefore, the psychic connection with soma implies from the first the necessity to represent what 
belongs to it, by taking the form of corporal the body unlike the soma is already « dwelt » by the psychic, 
meaning it already has a representation. In other words, Aisenstein’s theory implies a body (capable of 
being imagined) that interposes between psychic and soma. Thus, the representation effort would start 
with an effort through which the body appears where the soma was. (2010, p. 1369). 
In 1920, Freud modified the first theory regarding the psychic apparatus (unconscious, pre-conscious, 
conscious) elaborating his second theory in which psychic instances are Id (unorganized drive container 
of life and destructive drives) Ego and Superego. If the first theory satisfyingly explained the neurotic 
functioning (with the hysteria paradigm), the second theory represented an adaptation to the clinic’s non-
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neurotic pathologies. Today, we can say that the non-neurotic functioning includes not only the borderline 
pathology, but also the addictions and psychosomatic manifestations.  
Though, nowadays, psychoanalysis asserts that the neurotic functioning is the closest to healthy 
psychic functioning, or one of its conditions. In the psychoanalytic treatment an indicator of progress is 
the psychic transformation in the sense of « neurotisation » or « hysterisation ». Hence, the first Freudian 
model not only cannot be abandoned in the psychoanalytic theory, but it (re)becomes an actual alternative 
for the research of any pathologic functioning, including the psychosomatic one.  In the first model the 
accent is laid on the unconscious representation, while, in the second model, the economic, quantitative 
aspect of the drive’s movement force and act gain importance. This is also a model applicable to the study 
of affect as the affect is also defined as drive movement. 
Therefore, psychosomatics might be dealing with a psychic organization in which the drive force 
becomes more important than the meaning (Aisenstein, 2010, p. 1373). The meaning implies a 
representation capacity which also implies an integration of the subject’s passive position, opposed to the 
« acting » tendency. The representation is an inner transformation; the act tends to transform the external 
reality. Thus, the psychoanalytic cure of patients with borderline and somatic organizations might have 
the purpose of passing from a process directed towards act to a process capable of producing 
representations.  
For P. Marty soma is a field of dis-psyching the drive. In other words, somatisation is a « relapse » of 
the drive movement from the psychic in its somatic source, a regression of the drive towards its origin.   
If neurosis (with its paradigm of hysteria) is based on the hallucinating functioning illustrated by the 
dream effort, the borderline and psychosomatic organizations originate from a trauma and destructivity 
matter.  
On the other hand, L. Grinberg stated that the act is a dream that cannot be accomplished. Through the 
language’s transforming function, in the psychoanalytic cure, the « acting » tendency shall become a 
dream or the capacity to dream (Grinberg, 1968). B. Rosenberg emphasized the role of the waiting 
function in the metabolization and mentalization capacity, a waiting that implies the mobilisation of a 
primary erogenous masochism, needed for tolerating tension or pain.  This waiting makes possible the 
psychic effort, thus the representative effort (Rosenberg, 1991).   
But wasn’t the dream called the « the guardian of sleep», meaning an element that makes the somatic 
« waiting » possible until at the right time the awakening can occur?  The dream puts the soma in waiting, 
delays the awakening act.  The dream requires passivity, and the psychosomatic organization is based on 
an early traumatism that compromised the already passive position. (Savvopoulos, 2010, p. 1404). 
In psychosomatic patients, the deficiency of the primary masochism leads to running from the inner 
psychic conflictuality, leaving disorganization a free pass. That is why the « somatic solution » was 
qualified as being an « economic emergency solution » (Potamianou, 2010, p. 1361). 
3. Conclusions 
Psychic movements (and the drive, as psychic representative of somatic stimuli is already psychic) are 
headed, as expression, towards three registers: soma, behaviour and psychism. (Potamianou, 2010, p. 
1360). I shall resume the reference points laid down at the beginning of the paper, which is dream and act.  
The dream is about representation, which regresses from thinking to sensoriality and hallucination of 
perception. The movement is limited to the psychic space, to the internal reality, to the reversible 
subjective time. Somatisation shows the drive’s impossibility to « remain » in the representative and 
conflictual psychic space. The psychic tension is evacuated at the psychism border, but outside it, in 
soma, his territory of origin. However, the inner tension is not evacuated through the act, in the external 
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reality, of the irreversible time. This means that the « soma » forms, looking from inside the psychic 
space, a space located between the internal reality and the external reality of the behaviour.  
The Skin-ego also expressed the ego’s activity of « spacing » drives, as a way of giving them form 
(Savvopoulos, 2010, p. 1394), a condition of representation. Thus, somatisation could be seen, following 
Grinberg’s idea, as a drive movement that couldn’t be « dreamt » nor transformed in act, as a 
consequence of her impossibility to pass through the body. The body was also defined as a representation 
projected by self at the Ego’s frontier, as a psychic protection analogue to skin which guards the physical 
body.   
Thus, the comparative discussion regarding the somatisation process in relation with the dream and act 
reveals another difference, that between the body and soma. Freud considered that they were synonyms; it 
was just one body with psychic and somatic valances even in the case of actual neurosis. Marty thought 
that while the body is invested with libido thus pertaining to the psychic territory, being capable of 
elaboration (either representing for the subject himself or his object), soma lays on the ground of the de-
psyching of drive.  (Savvopoulos, 2010, p. 1397). 
A question arises: are we dealing with an evacuation in the de-psyching movement? If yes, the 
following hypothesis emerges. Trying to evacuate the psychic tension towards the exterior, in the form of 
an act, doesn’t the subject have a certain type of confusion between the body image and soma?  Can we 
anticipate this kind of confusion at the two protagonists taken as landmarks at the beginning of the paper, 
the Kreutzer Sonata (that mistook the act as dream) and M. Little (that maybe mistook the act as thought).  
The body lies within the psychic space, the soma outside of it. Then, the confusion they bring along 
would constitute a particular means of the generic pathological non-differentiation between the internal 
and the external reality. 
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